There is justice and there is injustice, but in terms of justice to be a virtue, it can be more readily applied as less a virtue and more so the mean between them. There isn’t so much a virtue when it comes to identifying justice as it is to the other virtues and their vices. Although, it is still capable of being mean in terms of virtues, it is simply more so the moderation between the various virtues playing upon one another and the vices that entice the multitudes of excess and deficiency throughout virtues and their outcomes.

Many acts that people tend to commit to can be directed with a certain virtue or a combination of them, thus with such acts one can find themselves facing varying choices to lead them in different directions. In doing so, one choice may be more appealing than the other under the conditions that they see in front of them; furthermore the set of virtues they have come to presumably by experience would aid them in such choices before them. However, what is to say that the choice that they made was just or unjust? A view unfolding the turn of their choices would dignify them with the vice and the virtue with the pressing forth of the choice, but the justification in which proves their decision right is not by the matter of justice as a virtue but rather the mean of the virtues and its vices that initiated said choice entirely. “[A]n action must be motivated by pleonexia, an overvaluing of wealth and honor, to count as unjust.” (Curzer 264). This supports the ideology that the virtue that is supposedly classified as justice isn’t truly a virtue, but it is instilled by virtues other than the acclaimed virtue that it is. Essentially, to provoke a topic that pertains to a matter of just and unjust outcomes you must have an over abundance of a specific virtue or many virtues.

To oppose such a matter of justice, you would simply look towards everyone being just, well just. To clarify on such a point, everyone would be at the supposed mean of virtues and in doing so there would be no disagreement on actions of virtues and their outcomes in due choices that pertain to each virtue. Every individual would find that the mean was correct and in doing so there would be a society without disagreement and thus no need for an identification of something other than the balance. Such a balance would consist of every known virtue or identified virtue to be with moderation in the correct portion, thus eliminating any sort of vice or negative outcome that we know of today. This would be the ‘mean’ that justice strives to achieve in specific aspects and the virtues it easily plays into. Although, we do all know that we do not live in the ideal society and the notion of everyone seeing every action at the mean of all virtues is relatively impossible, concluding that such a mean in justice would be unattainable.

It seems that most all people have a set of virtues that they seem to be much more opinionated (or have more emotion toward) than the other remaining virtues. In such way, they see the main vice in such situations and therefore, we are always with some sort of value in a number of virtues. Yet, my above arguments are based upon the fact that all the virtues lead to different subjects with their own separate vices to conclude both a negative reaction on both sides of the middle point of each virtue and thus justice is directed at holding the middle ground of each conflict that presses on any virtue. “[T]his vice, unlike others, does not import special motive, but rather the lack of one” (Curzer 264), this in reference to just distribution. However, I think that this could be extended to the matters of what is justice if not a virtue. Seeing as it does not have any sort of direct correlation to negative causation, therefore leading the belief of a mean being defined by justice and how it is to interact with the various virtues. For example, honor is a very generic virtue that many people strive for and others can go without. To each extreme holds a indifferent value, such that one who does not invest in honor will go without respect from ones peers and without recognition from others (this may also come to reflection in workplace or other environment). Thus work ethic and attitude towards the ways others perceive them would be negligible and furthermore squandering any advancement for their own good. Whereas you also have the opposing hand in which one could take far too much stock in honor and strive for every last view from others in nothing but the positive notion. In doing so, one may feel compelled to walk over others, ignoring other virtues to the point of what could be seen as injustice with excess resulting in vanity; to complete the previous scenario, with little to no concern with others, there would also be a displacement of other virtues to push the importance of honor aside along with that the simple vice of pusillanimity. The mean of honor sitting obviously between the two defined around magnanimity, which if someone was to yield such quality would be seen as just in the choices made pertaining to the honor virtue. The one who makes just acts sets the example at the middle ground of this virtue with not too great stock in honor along with the absence of deficiency of the very same thing. So, in such a way that there is a mean in the values of any virtue, it could be seen that just acts and justice in itself is that of what the mean person in any and all ideal virtues would pursue.

If justice was seen as a virtue, it seems strange as to exactly how it would have both an excess and deficiency towards itself. To say someone is just and unjust is close to matters of black and white, with much debate of course under some situations and little in others, regardless it always comes to one of two options. Most virtues lay upon three outcomes, as somewhat discussed already, deficiency, excess and a mean. Thus to say someone is partially just seems as though it could never apply to any one direct situation as many other virtues are able to. Just as someone under a choice of temperance as they come to invest or refrain from specific actions; thus if someone knows that they shouldn’t have another drink, and doesn’t one exerts ones actions under temperance. But if they act to never indulge in a drink while others are having a good time, they are seen as insensible. And to follow that, if they just completely let loose then they are seen as licentious. Thus there are three parts to this one virtue under the presented choice of a night out following the virtue of temperance: temperance itself (behaving in the mean), licentious (acting without temperance in excess), and finally insensibility (acting without temperance in deficiency). It is difficult to say that there is at all such a mean to justice, it is rather that you are either just or unjust. Is there an exception to virtues in which they do not follow the familiar pattern of excess, mean and deficiency?

Justice serves more so over most other applications as a mean throughout the various virtues that it can be applied to. And as it seems, there will rarely ever be a population that expresses sheer moderation in all the virtues that we commonly know to act upon (as we simply do not hold the capacity to do so). This is likely due to the indifference between individuals and how they have invested their own personalities amongst sets of virtues. In doing so, there are different views on what is seen as just and unjust. Yet, with however many perceptions of specific actions are found to be either an injustice or rather justice as purest it can be, there will be some disagreement; with that disagreement there is no mean to support a virtue of justice in itself. Rather, the black and white answers that come from disputes of justice provide the mean for virtues and justices ability to moderate virtues through finding both excess and deficiencies.